DUBLIN--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The "The Quantum Threat to Blockchain: Emerging Business Opportunities" report has been added to ResearchAndMarkets.com's offering.
This new research report identifies not only the challenges, but also the opportunities in terms of new products and services that arise from the threat that quantum computers pose to the "blockchain" mechanism.
According to a recent study by the consulting firm Deloitte, approximately one-fourth of the blockchain-based cybercurrency Bitcoin in circulation in 2022 is vulnerable to quantum attack. This report covers both technical and policy issues relating to the quantum vulnerability of blockchain.
The analyst foresees major commercial opportunities arising to protect blockchain against future quantum computer intrusions and agrees with the White House National Security Memorandum NSM-10, released on May 04, 2022, which indicates the urgency of addressing imminent quantum computing threats and the risks they present to the economy and to national security in the latest report "The Quantum Threat to Blockchain: Emerging Business Opportunities".
Although primarily associated with cryptocurrencies, blockchain has been proposed for a wide range of transactions, including in insurance, real estate, voting, supply chain tracking, gaming, etc. These areas are all vulnerable to quantum threats, which lead to operations disruption, trust damage, and loss of intellectual property, financial assets, and regulated data.
Quantum computers threaten classical public-key cryptography blockchain technologies because they can break the computational security assumptions of elliptic curve cryptography. They also weaken the security of hash function algorithms, which protect blockchain's secrets.
- With NIST announcing a new set of PQC standards in July 2022, PQC firms will soon be receiving major investments in the near term much of which will apply to blockchain. However, not all NIST-based PQC solutions will be feasible for blockchain use. Given the nature and intricacy of PQC, it will take years of planning for a successful migration to PQC-backed Blockchain protection.
- The earliest of expenditures on quantum safe technology in the block chain market will go to protecting data from attacks later, when quantum computing resources become mature. This issue becomes more important as we grow closer to the day when powerful quantum computers become a reality. But data theft today requires preemptive action. The quantum threat to the blockchain means that business opportunities in this space are emerging right now.
- There is a need for low-cost information-theoretically secure (ITS) solutions that instantly strengthen standardized cryptography systems used in blockchains. Already much discussed in this context are quantum-enabled blockchain architectures based on Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Another important concept is quantum-enabled blockchain, which refers to an entire blockchain or some aspects of the blockchain functionality being run in quantum computing environments.
- Mining is another aspect of blockchains vulnerable to quantum attacks. Mining is the consensus process that certifies new transactions and keeps blockchain activities protected. One risk with mining is that miners using quantum computers could launch a 51% attack. A 51% attack is when a single entity controls more than half of the computational power of the blockchain. A quantum attack on mining would undermine the network's hashing power.
Key Topics Covered:
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Objective and Scope of this Report
1.1.1 The Threat of Quantum Computers to Blockchain
1.2 Cryptography Background to this Report
1.2.1 Concerned Organizations
1.2.2 NIST PQC Efforts and Beyond
1.2.3 Addressable Market for Quantum-safe Cybercurrency
1.3 The Goals of this Report
Chapter Two: Classical Blockchain Cryptography and Quantum Computing Attacks
2.1 Overview of the Quantum Threat
2.2 NIST and Post-quantum Cryptography
2.2.1 Structure of the NIST PQC Effort
2.2.2 Importance of Asymmetric Digital Signatures
2.2.3 Impact of Doubling Key Size
2.2.4 Algorithm Security Strength
2.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
2.4 Quantum Attack Resources Estimates to Break ECC and DSA
2.5 Quantum Resistant Cryptography for Blockchains
2.5.1 Taproot and Bitcoin Core
2.5.2 Impact of NIST-based PQC Algorithms
2.6 Post-quantum Random Oracle Model
2.6.1 Modeling Random Oracles for Quantum Attackers
2.7 Summary of this Chapter
Chapter Three: Quantum Opportunities of the Blockchain Kind
3.1 Blockchain Basics
3.1.1 What are Classical Blockchains?
3.2 Quantum-Enabled Blockchain
3.2.1 Role of Quantum-safe Security Technologies
3.3 Blockchain Security
3.3.1 Role of Conventional Cryptography
3.3.2 Attacks on Classical Cryptography
22.214.171.124 Some Known Attacks Against ECDSA
126.96.36.199 ECDSA Key Pair Generation:
188.8.131.52 Signature Computation:
184.108.40.206 Blockchain Security Summary:
3.4 Mitigating Cyberattacks on Blockchains
3.5 Blockchain Security: Entropy/Randomness
3.5.1 Examples of Low Entropy Attacks
3.6 Random Number Generator Product Evolution
3.6.4 OpenSSL 3.0
3.7 Summary of this Chapter
Chapter Four: Quantum Impacts on the Cryptocurrency Business
4.1 Qubit and Quantum Gates
4.1.2 Quantum Gates
4.1.3 Quantum Fourier Transform
4.1.5 Amplitude Amplification
4.2 Quantum Algorithms
4.2.1 Shor's Algorithm
4.3 Specific Quantum Threat to Blockchains
4.3.1 Risk of Quantum Attack in Authentication
4.3.2 Grover's Algorithm and Hashing
4.4 Risk of Quantum Attack in Mining
4.5 Nonce Attacks
4.6 Blockchain Data Structures
4.7 Summary of this Chapter
Chapter Five: Quantum Hash and QKD
5.1 Classical to Quantum Hashing Functions
5.1.1 Summary: Quantum Hashing Functions
5.2 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
5.2.1 Technical Issues
5.2.2 Issues Needing Work in Blockchain Enabled QKD
220.127.116.11 Summary: QKD Technical Issues and Blockchain Integration
18.104.22.168 Software-defined Networking QKD and Blockchain
5.3 Notes on Interface Protocols
5.3.1 Southbound Interface
5.3.2 Northbound Interface Protocol
5.3.3 Resource Allocation
5.4 Steps Blockchain Organizations Can Take Now
5.5 Summary of this Chapter
About the Publisher
About the Analyst
Acronyms and Abbreviations Used In this Report
For more information about this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/r/jvrwph
Laura Wood, Senior Press Manager
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